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 In 1742, William Shirley, governor of  the Province of  
Massachusetts Bay, gave a foreboding speech to the colony’s 
House of  Representatives. In it, he called for a law that would 
prohibit impressment, the forced recruitment of  merchant sail-
ors into the Royal Navy. Shirley wanted the House to “pass an 
Act for effectually preventing this evil Practice” that would oth-
erwise create a “great charge and Trouble to this government 
in providing Seamen for his Majesty’s Ships of  War.”1 While 
arguing against impressment on account of  these difficulties, 
he also cited the human cost incurred by “officers…impress-
ing Men indiscriminately to the Great Grievance of  particular 
families,” pointing to impressment’s effects on Boston’s sailors.2 
Shirley also asked for an “account of  the progress made in the 
Works at Castle William,” a fortification overlooking the entrance 
to Boston Harbor, in the hopes that its construction would be 
completed quickly.3 Little did he know, these issues would soon 
be linked together in an imminent crisis in the colony.
 Five years later, in the fall of  1747, Commodore Charles 
Knowles of  the Royal Navy made port in Boston as his squad-
ron sailed from Louisbourg to his new command in the West 
Indies. Prior to landing in New England, sailors deserted the 
warships, forcing Knowles to gather supplies and recoup the 
loss of  able-bodied sailors. On November 17, falling back on 
the Royal Navy’s practice of  impressing sailors to fill ships’ 
crews, Knowles sent press gangs to comb merchant ships exiting 
Boston Harbor and press men off  Boston’s wharves. The gangs 
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were supposed to locate the deserters, or at least press non-local 
sailors, but they ultimately took men indiscriminately off  the 
docks, without regard to occupation or origin.4 In response, a 
riot broke out in Boston that spiraled out of  control as it raged 
for three days. Assembled on the waterfront, the rioters engaged 
in escalating displays of  dissatisfaction. After Governor Shirley 
unsuccessfully tried to calm the crowd, he was forced to flee to 
the safety of  Castle William, which, luckily, had been completed 
in the five years since his aforementioned speech. Shortly there-
after, tensions continued to mount. Matters were brought to the 
brink of  extreme violence when Knowles began preparing to 
bombard the town.5 He only relented after receiving a written 
petition from Governor Shirley that asked him to desist and re-
lease the impressed men. After some of  the men were released, 
the rioting subsided and the mob dispersed.6
Sir Charles Knowles (1704–1777), the British Royal Navy 
officer responsible for the outbreak of  the eponymous 
Knowles Riot in November 1747 
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 The relatively few sources that directly discuss the af-
fair encompass a broad spectrum of  social classes and politi-
cal affiliations. For example, the mentality of  the mob can be 
assessed through depositions from the libel case of  Knowles v. 
Douglass (1748–49). While letters from officials such as Governor 
Shirley and Commodore Knowles provide the point of  view of  
the political and naval elite who opposed the rioters, the his-
torical account of  then-Speaker Thomas Hutchinson reveals the 
perspective of  a more sympathetic faction of  the political elite.7 
Newspaper accounts, both in Boston and England, provided a 
forum for voices across the political spectrum. The letters pub-
lished in these accounts also give a unique outlook on the rioting. 
Some writers, such as William Douglass, published pamphlets 
that supported the opposition to impressment based solely on 
economic interests.8 Others, such as Samuel Adams, presented 
an emergent intellectual perspective that justified the riot as a 
defense of  the sailors’ “natural Right[s]” and their “Liberties.”9 
Through these sources, a cross-section of  Bostonian opinion 
can be brought to light.
 The Knowles Riot must be juxtaposed with the develop-
ment of  opposition to impressment across the British Atlantic, 
but thus far many historians have interpreted the riot in a variety 
of  other contexts. Some, such as Jack Tager, understand it as an 
example of  social conflict, characterizing it as part of  a series of  
“acts of  selective communal violence” perpetrated by “Boston’s 
plebeians,” thereby drawing focus to the regional context.10 Simi-
larly, Russell Bourne’s description of  the affair as a “community 
uprising” draws attention to the particularities of  Boston’s so-
ciety.11 Marxist historians, such as Peter Linebaugh and Marcus 
Rediker, prefer to cast the Knowles Riot in terms of  the “motley 
crew’s resistance to slavery,” emphasizing the sailors’ unification 
against political and military authority.12 Others synthesize these 
two schools of  thought. In particular, John Lax and William Pen-
cak try to combine them in their analysis. On the one hand, they 
are “especially convinced” by the Marxists’ focus on the “sailors’ 
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agency,” while on the other, they differentiate Boston from other 
port cities and emphasize its local context.13 They also make their 
own contribution, claiming that the mob included “people of  all 
classes,” implying more widespread participation than the prole-
tarian analyses.14 This extant literature thus analyzes the Knowles 
Riot through a variety of  differing perspectives.
 The context of  other riots in the British Atlantic, how-
ever, exposes the similarities and innovations of  the Knowles 
Riot in a way that has been left largely unexplored. The long 
tradition of  impressment in the Royal Navy has been accom-
panied by an equally storied tradition of  opposition. Impress-
ment riots in other ports across the Atlantic can be used to bring 
the defining features of  the Knowles Riot into relief. Certainly, 
this transatlantic context clarifies the mob’s actions in Boston 
when they align with practices elsewhere, but it also exposes the 
divergences between the Knowles Riot and other opposition. 
In this caricature by famed printmaker James Gilray, a press gang is depicted 
as taking a young man off  the docks in London in 1779. Similar riots took 
place across the British Atlantic throughout the eighteenth century.
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By understanding these divergences as a product of  the Knowles 
Riot’s local and temporal context, the nature of  resistance in 
the pre-Revolutionary American colonies can be distinguished. 
The events of  the Knowles Riot draw particular attention to the 
interactions between Boston’s mob and its elite population. In 
one sense, the mob’s objections parallel the grievances espoused 
in other impressment riots. The sailors’ complaints mirror E.P. 
Thompson’s description of  the moral economy of  British crowds, 
which felt they were “defending traditional rights or customs” 
during bread riots.15 Sailors across the British Atlantic would 
protest when they felt that the traditional balance of  power had 
been disrupted and Boston’s mob proved to be no exception. In 
another sense, the mob in Boston seems to have been composed 
of  a much broader segment of  society, drawing on members of  
the lower orders across the town. Similar nuances apply to Bos-
ton’s divided elite, with some wealthy Bostonians supporting the 
government and a mercantile interest opposing impressment. 
This cleavage was fairly typical of  impressment riots. In Bos-
ton, however, it seems that a unique opposition arose among an 
intellectual elite that justified the riots based on conceptions of  
natural rights and liberties. Thompson notes that “men of  edu-
cation and address” often “endorsed the theories of  the crowd” 
in English bread riots.16 Though such views were occasionally 
adopted by wealthy Englishmen, the intellectual elite in Boston 
applied their arguments as justifications for a specific instance of  
maritime opposition. The transatlantic context of  the Knowles 
Riot underscores similarities, such as the mob’s grievances and 
an elite economic opposition to impressment, but also exposes 
important distinctions, such as the mob’s diverse composition 
and an emergent elite philosophical opposition to impressment.
 The details of  the Knowles Riot deserve more thorough 
discussion to better contextualize its severity. As mentioned 
briefly above, the riot started after Commodore Knowles began 
pressing men on November 17, 1747. Depositions from the libel 
suit Knowles v. Douglass reveal that he sent press gangs to take men 
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from outbound ships.17 Though Knowles denied it, the same 
depositions also claim that his men came onto the wharves of  
Boston, pressing sailors and craftsmen into service. Both devel-
opments deviated from the Royal Navy’s convention of  pressing 
sailors from inbound ships.18 In response, rioters protested and 
demanded the release of  the impressed men. Some protesters 
took Knowles’s officers as hostages with the hopes of  ransoming 
them in exchange. By November 19, the Massachusetts House 
of  Representatives ordered that “all other officers…[should] be 
forthwith set at Liberty,” indicating this practice’s prevalence.19 
Other tactics were also employed as protesters gathered around 
the Governor’s House, provoking a violent confrontation be-
tween the mob and British officers.20 Though Shirley spoke to 
calm the mob, he was unsuccessful and eventually fled to Castle 
William. The governor’s flight was precipitated by Boston’s mili-
tia ignoring his call to put down the rioters.21 Historically, it was 
not unusual for British militias to fail to put down riots. Thomp-
son notes that British officers exhibited a “general reluctance to 
employ military force” against rioters.22 In the Bostonian con-
text, however, the militiamen seem to have been especially active 
in the rioting.23 Though Shirley insisted that he did not “retire…
for Safety to [his] Person,” it seems that the size of  the mob 
forced him to seek refuge in the fortification.24 Even in these 
first moments, the actions of  the rioters escalated rapidly.
 Over the ensuing days, the protesters engaged in several 
further demonstrations. At one point they took a barge, mistak-
enly considered the Royal Navy’s property but actually owned 
by a Scottish merchant, and burned it in the middle of  Bos-
ton Common.25 Thomas Hutchinson’s History of  the Province of  
Massachusets-Bay [sic] uses this incident to discuss the mob’s orga-
nization. Though the mob initially intended to burn the barge in 
front of  the Governor’s House, it “diverted” the plan “from a 
consideration of  the danger of  setting the town on fire,” demon-
strating that it did not rage devoid of  reason.26 At the same time, 
however, the rioters were not afraid to engage in radical acts of  
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protest. As the mob swelled into a group of  thousands of  dis-
gruntled Bostonians drawn from an array of  diverse professions, 
its actions grew bolder.27 For example, the mob congregated near 
the House of  Representatives hoping to secure the release of  the 
pressed men. Governor Shirley wrote that when the rioters “sur-
rounded the Court-House,” they offered “outrageous Insults on 
the Authority of  this Government.”28 After their unsuccessful 
appeal, the members of  the mob threw rocks at the recently 
vacated building, shattering its windows.29 Matters finally came 
to a head as the riot neared its conclusion, when Knowles posi-
tioned ships to bombard the city.30 Ultimately, Governor Shirley 
convinced the commodore to release some of  the pressed men, 
at which point the rioting subsided. After Knowles dismissed 
“most, if  not all, of  the inhabitants who had been impressed,” 
the governor returned from Castle William.31 The imminent dan-
ger of  escalating violence had been avoided through Governor 
Shirley’s intervention.
 Following Shirley’s return, the town and government 
began making amends. As Hutchinson notes, an “uncommon 
appearance of  the militia of  the town of  Boston” gathered to 
receive the governor.32 Newspapers reported that this was “the 
most numerous and best Appearance of  the Militia under Arms, 
that has been known for divers Years past,” as the townspeople 
tried to show their obedience to Governor Shirley.33 In the 
following days, both the House of  Representatives and mem-
bers of  the Boston Town Meeting issued several resolves that 
condemned the rioting. The meeting’s resolution attempted to 
blame the riot on “foreign Seamen, Servants, Negroes, and other 
Persons of  mean and vile Condition,” while asserting that “this 
Town [has] the utmost Abhorrence of  all such illegal criminal 
Proceedings.”34 Meanwhile, Shirley publicly offered “One Hun-
dred Pounds Old Tenor as a Reward” for those who informed 
on the leaders of  the mob while calling on the rioters to “sur-
render themselves up to Justice.”35 With this reconciliation of  
the people and their government, the Knowles Riot came to a 
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peaceful resolution.
 The other necessary contextual component is the tem-
poral and spatial background of  transatlantic opposition to im-
pressment in ports across the British Empire. Impressment was 
one of  the essential methods by which the Royal Navy manned 
its warships. As historian N.A.M. Rodger discusses, the Royal 
Navy relied on a “symbiosis of  trade and sea,” in which mer-
chant mariners were taken from merchant ships and ports to fill 
warships’ crews with experienced sailors.36 In return, the Royal 
Navy protected merchant ships on the high seas. Since sailors of-
ten preferred the higher wages paid for service aboard merchant-
men, the military relied on compulsory service to crew its ships.37 
This necessity was the impetus for Knowles’s press in 1747. Even 
contemporary opponents of  impressment recognized the need 
for able-bodied sailors. Samuel Adams, one of  impressment’s 
staunchest colonial opponents, conceded that it would pose a 
significant “difficulty…to man the Navy” without the “heavy…
Grievance” of  impressment, indicating the common knowledge 
that men could only be enticed to sail by force.38 Throughout 
the Atlantic, it was understood that the only way for the Royal 
Navy to crew the warships that would protect merchantmen was, 
ironically, by stripping the merchant marine of  its sailors through 
impressment.
 Though necessary, the practice was constrained by sev-
eral customs that limited its scope and usage. By the mid-eigh-
teenth century, impressment was becoming increasingly formally 
regulated through a series of  institutional changes in the Royal 
Navy. In 1745, Parliament appointed regulating captains, a fore-
runner of  the Seven Years’ War’s formalized Impress Service, 
to uphold certain standards.39 Among these standards, the press 
gangs were supposed to release men who were not sailors or 
who held protections, a type of  exemption.40 When these norms 
were violated in Boston in 1747, it would have made sailors’ 
grievances even more acute and their reactions even more se-
vere. To borrow from Thompson, it was often the “outrage to 
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these moral assumptions” that sparked the sailors’ direct action.41 
Impressment was also limited by a tradition that gangs required 
warrants. Rodger is quick to point out that there was “no legal 
necessity” for press gangs to receive these warrants from local 
magistrates or officials.42 As Nicholas Rogers suggests, however, 
warrants became a practical necessity for press gangs in the Brit-
ish Empire, as they dissuaded imposters and restrained the gangs 
with a form of  due process.43 In Boston, a controversy arose 
over the legitimacy of  the press gang’s warrant. According to 
Governor Shirley, a member of  the mob claimed that his “unjus-
tifiable Impress Warrant” caused the rioting.44 Certainly, Shirley 
did not improve matters when he responded that he had never 
issued a warrant for the press gangs.45 Nonetheless, the conversa-
tion demonstrates the importance of  warrants in the practice 
of  impressment. The traditional, legalistic restraints provided 
a framework for restricting impressment in the mid-eighteenth 
century British Empire.
 A secondary set of  limitations was centered on the 
physical space in which impressment occurred. This type of  re-
straint was related to the places and categories of  ships subject 
to impressment, such as the distinction between impressment 
on the waterfront and aboard ships at sea. This distinction had 
ramifications for the organization of  opposition to the gangs. 
For example, in Liverpool in 1759, the crew of  the Golden Lion 
opposed a press gang from HMS Vengeance that tried to board 
the ship.46 The fighting that broke out was limited to the two 
crews, with the Golden Lion’s men using harpoons to stave off  the 
warship’s gang.47 Conversely, a riot in Bristol that year featured 
“three hundred seamen” who “gathered in a riotous manner” 
in response to a press gang’s attempts to take sailors from the 
wharves.48 In Boston, the dynamics of  opposition would be in-
fluenced by Knowles’s gang taking men from ships in the harbor 
and off  the docks.
 Similarly, there was a distinction between the categories 
of  ships that were subject to impressment. Merchant sailors and 
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the Royal Navy tacitly understood that only inbound ships would 
be pressed.49 As Denver Brunsman understands it, this implicit 
rule was intended to prevent the practice of  impressment from 
undermining the strength of  the empire. By only pressing in-
bound ships, the Royal Navy prevented itself  from crippling 
merchantmen before they left port.50 This practice provided the 
ancillary benefit that all pressed sailors would have gained experi-
ence aboard the merchantmen. Linda Colley even suggests that 
this experience was “indispensable for the operation of  [Brit-
ish] naval power.”51 However, if  the Royal Navy took men from 
outbound ships, Brunsman notes that it would be “more likely…
to trigger violence.”52 Hutchinson’s complaint that Knowles’s 
men took sailors off  ships that were “outward bound as well as 
others” can be understood within this context.53 These further 
constraints on impressment were part of  the shared expectations 
of  limitations on the press gangs’ practices.
 In general, various forms of  opposition to impressment 
arose when the Royal Navy ignored the traditional limitations. 
Surprisingly, as Rodger discusses, sailors generally accepted the 
necessity of  the practice and only resisted under special circum-
stances when its customs were violated.54 While some opponents 
attempted to use the law, others resorted to political means or 
even physical violence. Legal attempts to prohibit impressment 
utilized legislation and lawsuits to defend sailors. For example, in 
Broadfoot’s Case (1743), a sailor charged with murder for shooting 
a member of  a press gang was supported by the public as a pro-
tector of  British liberties.55 Through a circumstantial technicality, 
the jury was directed to bring in a verdict of  manslaughter, while 
Sir Michael Foster, the Recorder of  Bristol, wrote an opinion 
that supported the general legality of  impressment.56 Still, legal 
attempts to limit impressment achieved a victory in the North 
American colonies through the Sixth of  Anne Act of  1708. The 
law stipulated that, barring deserters, no one in the American 
colonies could be pressed by British officers.57 Though this law 
was intended to promote commerce during Queen Anne’s War, 
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its status became ambiguous at the conclusion of  the conflict 
in 1713. While it was unclear if  the law was still valid, sailors 
in North American ports endorsed a continuation of  the ban, 
but British officials dismissed it as a wartime measure.58 In the 
midst of  this legal ambiguity, Parliament passed another law in 
1746 that prohibited impressment in the West Indies, which was 
theoretically already protected by the Sixth of  Anne.59 The pas-
sage of  the new law implied that the Sixth of  Anne’s universal 
protections were no longer binding in the American colonies. 
The uncertainty over impressment’s legality in North America 
would become a flashpoint for the Knowles Riot, with contem-
poraries claiming that the West Indies’ exemption placed an un-
due burden on New England.60 These legal attempts constituted 
one strain of  broader transatlantic resistance.
 Alternative types of  resistance, such as political bargain-
ing and physical violence, also emerged as practical forms of  op-
position to impressment. One such political response involved 
the direct mediation of  municipal governments. As Rodger 
notes, both political and economic interests drove the desire to 
mitigate the effects of  impressment.61 In the British Isles, several 
cities eventually coordinated with the Royal Navy to standard-
ize and limit its impressment efforts. Bristol’s strong municipal 
government reached an agreement with the navy around 1746 
that would provide a fixed number of  sailors in exchange for 
an exemption from impressment ashore.62 On the other hand, 
a comparatively weak local government in Liverpool could not 
provide the same mediation, leading to more frequent clashes 
between the navy and the mob.63 Though other historical and de-
mographic factors affected the frequency of  riots, this discrep-
ancy shows the potential role of  civil government in mediating 
the tensions caused by impressment. Such clashes between the 
navy and the mob provide a background to better understand 
the Knowles Riot. In fact, as Nicholas Rogers documents, there 
were “at least 55 affrays against the press gangs” over the dura-
tion of  King George’s War.64 The character of  the unrest can 
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be generalized through selected examples. Though sympathetic 
civilians often assisted the rioters, especially when non-sailors 
were pressed, the sailors largely led resistance efforts. Usually, 
when press gangs attempted to press men directly from mer-
chant ships, only the sailors aboard the ship opposed them and 
the affair seldom spread more widely. For example, when a gang 
from HMS Winchelsea attempted to press the crew of  the Tarleton 
near Liverpool in 1744, the sailors directly resisted by firing on 
the warship before ultimately disappearing into the town.65 On 
the other hand, when press gangs went ashore, resistance usu-
ally spread across the maritime community. As expected, these 
riots were substantially larger. In February 1762, for example, 
hundreds of  sailors, carpenters, and shipwrights gathered in Liv-
erpool to protest the impressment of  twenty-five sailors.66 The 
previously mentioned 1759 riot in Bristol swelled to nearly three 
hundred sailors who united against the press gang.67 Though 
each impressment riot had unique characteristics, these examples 
typify patterns of  opposition in the British Empire.
 The grievances of  the mob in Boston can be related to 
these examples of  resistance to impressment. In fact, many of  
the arguments made by members of  the mob, or by elite writers 
on their behalf, echo those made in prior instances of  opposi-
tion. One particular type of  grievance found in the historical 
record is the sailors’ pragmatic objections. A frequent refrain of  
the sailors is the incredible personal suffering imposed by the 
press. The Knowles Riot even galvanized one writer to publicize 
the “prodigious hardships we [sailors] daily suffer” as a result of  
impressment.68 The deposition of  Josiah Gains from Knowles v. 
Douglass paints a startling picture of  the harshness with which men 
were pressed from their merchant ships. As Gains recounted, he 
was “Surprized with four Barges & about 80 men well armed” 
from the Royal Navy who suddenly began boarding his ship.69 
Ultimately, the press gang informed Gains that they would “take 
every Man Except the Captain out of  the Ship,” stripping the 
ship of  its crew.70 Historians have corroborated similar accounts 
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in which “whole crews…were taken, and outward-bound ves-
sels were raided for men.”71 Several letters published in Boston’s 
newspapers echoed the concerns of  the pressed sailors. In a 
letter printed by the Independent Advertiser, the author noted that 
impressed men were often “Heads of  Families” and called upon 
his audience to recognize the “Hardships which must ensue 
from” the “intolerable” impressment and “the Distresses which 
must arise” from such a “Prodigious Depopulation,” both for 
the community and individuals.72 Similarly, the author noted that 
impressment creates a “Destruction of  the Youth” not unlike 
the “Destruction of  the Spring,” emphasizing the negative con-
sequences of  depriving Boston of  its young male population.73 
The mob’s pragmatic grievances underscore the profound ef-
fects of  impressment and align with developments in the Atlan-
tic maritime world.
 In addition to these practical arguments, the members 
of  the mob also produced several quasi-legal arguments that, 
though specific to the Bostonian context, align with arguments 
used elsewhere in the British Atlantic. Some of  these complaints 
related to the process of  Knowles’s impressment. While the very 
initial stages remain unclear, some sources report that the mob 
was unhappy with a ruse played by Knowles. In England, the 
Whitehall Evening Post reported that the “Insurrection at Boston 
[was] occasioned” when Knowles tricked Boston’s sailors by “or-
dering a Schooner to be advertised to go [as] a Privateer on the 
Spanish Main, for which they beat up for Volunteers” and then 
“immediately impressed all the Men from the Merchant Ships 
in the Harbour that were ready to go under his Convoy,” using 
the ruse to fool Boston’s sailors.74 Supposedly “exasperated…
to such a Degree” by this deception, the people began to riot.75 
Though this report omits several details when recounting the 
rioting, it exemplifies some of  the legalistic arguments that at-
tempted to invalidate impressment.76 
 More broadly, Bostonian sailors produced quasi-legal 
arguments that Knowles’s press had violated the traditions 
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of  impressment.77 As Joseph Ballard, a sailor in Commodore 
Knowles’s squadron, acknowledged in his deposition, the mob 
was allegedly “Occasioned by the Men of  War’s Boats coming 
up to Town.”78 This understanding implies that the mob was spe-
cifically agitated by Knowles’s press on the wharves. As seen in 
other cases in the British Empire, the method of  impressment, 
land-based or ship-based, played a significant role in its accept-
ability in different ports. Similarly, another argument was made 
regarding the types of  ships that were accosted by Knowles’s 
press gangs. As Josiah Gains mentioned in his deposition, he 
told the gang that his vessel was “Outward bound” but they 
only “Damned him & order’d him to go Immediately into their 
boat.”79 Thomas Hutchinson also made note of  the fact that the 
gangs took men off  ships that were “outward bound as well as 
others.”80 This mention implies that, at the very least, the depar-
ture from tradition was noteworthy. The press gangs’ disregard 
for this custom drew the ire of  the mob and Boston’s general 
population, especially once it was noticed by the sailors who 
understood impressment’s implicit code of  conduct. A related 
Thomas Hutchinson (1711–1780) served as speaker of  the General 
Court from 1746 to 1749. His History of  the Province of  Massachusetts Bay 
is a crucial source for understanding the Knowles Riot.
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allegation arose that an irregular assortment of  people was taken. 
Hutchinson notes that the press gangs also took “some ship car-
penters’ apprentices and laboring land men.”81 In one case, “two 
apprentices” who were accosted were able to avoid impressment 
only after claiming that “they were about their Master’s busi-
ness.”82 Jonathan Tarbox noted that he avoided impressment by 
claiming that he was only a caulker, although others were not as 
fortunate.83 Additionally, though specific to the North American 
context, sailors tried to make the case that impressment in Bos-
ton was illegal or, at least, unfair. Due to the Sixth of  Anne Act, 
there was a lingering controversy about impressment’s legality in 
the North American colonies, with British jurists claiming that 
the law had expired and sailors concluding that its provisions 
against impressment were still binding.84 Several letters published 
in the local newspapers picked up similar arguments. In one case, 
an anonymous author channeled the sailors’ concerns by writing 
that, since Boston was “singled out from the rest of  the King’s 
Provinces” for these “Scenes of  Depredation,” Knowles’s press 
gang was committing an “Injustice.”85 Together, these types of  
complaints and arguments, both practical and legal in nature, 
represent the ways in which the Boston mob recapitulated the 
anti-impressment arguments of  sailors across the British Em-
pire.
 However, the transatlantic comparison also reveals how 
Boston’s mob featured wider social participation that transcend-
ed maritime relationships and included members from across 
Bostonian society. At the end of  the riot, both the House of  
Representatives and members of  the Boston Town Meeting tried 
to distance the population of  Boston from the tumult. Even so, 
as Brunsman argues, by offering such strong censure following the 
riot, these bodies ironically imply how emphatically Bostonians 
had united against impressment during the riot.86 Similarly, Lax 
and Pencak suggest that the town was “appearing to suppress 
a crowd it had in fact supported” by uniting in post-riot con-
demnation to ensure that “the town avoided Knowles’s guns.”87 
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On November 19, the House of  Representatives passed a re-
solve that “there has been…a tumultuous riotous Assembling of  
Armed Seamen, Servants, Negroes and others in the Town of  
Boston,” trying to shift blame from the citizens who participated 
in the rioting to social outsiders and non-Bostonians.88 The Bos-
ton Town Meeting made a similar proclamation on December 
17, calling the riot a product of  “foreign Seamen,” further remov-
ing the maritime population from the city as a whole, while also 
blaming “Servants, Negroes, and other Persons of  mean and vile 
Condition.”89 In the same resolve, members of  the Boston Town 
Meeting tried to prove their obedience by proclaiming their “ut-
most Abhorrence of  all such illegal criminal Proceedings.”90 As 
a supposed “Proof ” of  the alleged innocence of  the town and 
that the “Mind of  the Inhabitants of  the Town” was against such 
“Tumult and Disorders,” many newspapers proclaimed that “the 
most numerous and best Appearance of  the Militia” arose at the 
end of  the riot.91 Following the riot, Bostonian political organi-
zations engaged in a deliberate attempt to distance the citizenry 
from the proceedings.
 These demonstrations were likely intended to prevent 
potential retaliatory attacks on the city. After all, Governor Shir-
ley had threatened an “infamous Reproach upon the Duty and 
Loyalty of  the Town” if  they failed to prove their loyalty.92 This 
threat of  retribution clearly had a significant effect, to the extent 
that even individuals tried to prevent harm from befalling the city 
on account of  the unrest. For example, Gershom Flagg, a sailor 
in Knowles’s squadron, recalled telling the commodore that he 
was “sorrey that the Innocent should suffer with the gilty” and 
insisted that “no men of  Distinction or of  any free Hold ware 
[sic] among the mob or Riot.”93 Although Flagg claimed to be 
from the city’s North End, he clearly could have had no idea 
about who was actually supporting the mob because of  his ser-
vice aboard the warships in the harbor. Nonetheless, Flagg had a 
vested interest in convincing the commodore that the mob was 
composed mainly of  foreigners, sailors, and slaves, as did the 
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other individuals and political bodies that were trying to protect 
the city. By assigning blame to otherwise marginalized groups in 
Bostonian society, many people and political institutions associ-
ated with the riots tried to spare Boston from retribution.
 In fact, a closer examination of  the rioting reveals that 
the mob in the Knowles Riot was composed of  a much broader 
cross section of  society than other impressment riots of  the 
period. While sailors may have initiated the unrest, it ultimately 
included craftsmen and other Bostonians. The account given by 
Thomas Hutchinson documents this broad support for the riot-
ing. For example, Hutchinson wrote that in the early phases of  
unrest “several thousand people assembled in King Street” in 
protest.94 Though this estimate is not exact, any gathering of  that 
magnitude would be astounding since Boston had only approxi-
mately 16,382 residents in 1742.95 Hutchinson even explicitly 
commented on the character of  the forming mob. He recorded 
that “men of  all orders resented [the press],” indicating how 
deeply the anti-impressment sentiment permeated Bostonian 
society.96 The mob’s broad composition is further implied by its 
choice of  weapons. The “sticks, clubs, [and] pitchmops” used 
during the unrest were not particularly maritime weapons, such 
as cutlasses, pistols, or miscellaneous nautical equipment includ-
ing marlinspikes.97 Governor Shirley’s letters reveal that he was 
aware that the uproar was not limited to the city’s sailors. Shirley 
wrote publicly that there was “Reason to apprehend that the 
Insurrection was…encourag’d by some ill-minded inhabitants, 
and persons of  influence in the town,” signifying that he also be-
lieved that townspeople had joined in the rioting.98 Though there 
were some supportive “Officers and Gentlemen of  the Town,” 
his retreat to Castle William implies that the affair was more se-
rious and widespread than a mere maritime squabble.99 Other 
notable figures echoed this sentiment, including Samuel Adams, 
who wrote that “the People” were “running together for their 
mutual Defence.”100 Even contemporary writers acknowledged 
the significant participation of  Boston’s non-sailor population.
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 An indicator of  the widespread nature of  the upheaval 
was the response of  Boston’s militia, or rather, the lack thereof. 
Shirley, when he fled to Castle William, noted that he could not 
raise “a proper force for Suppressing this Insurrection” and that 
he could not even defend the Governor’s House.101 Even more 
directly, Shirley wrote that “the soldiers of  the militia…[have] 
refus’d and neglected to obey my Orders…to appear in Arms,” 
indicating that the city militia, composed of  Bostonians across 
professions and social classes, could not be raised.102 This inabil-
ity to raise the militia is telling. Certainly, it is possible that the mi-
litiamen refused to respond amid the chaos of  the ongoing pro-
tests for a number of  practical reasons, including fear of  looming 
conflict with fellow Bostonians.103 Given the descriptions of  the 
size and composition of  the mob, however, it is likely that the 
militia did not form because its members were, to some degree, 
participants in the riot. The militia, intrinsically local in character, 
likely would have had few sailors among its ranks. Therefore, 
its refusal to muster on Governor Shirley’s orders suggests the 
degree to which the non-sailor population joined the rioters. 
On November 19, the colony’s executive council condemned 
the ongoing “dangerous Insurrection of  Seamen and others” in 
Boston.104 This mention of  the presence of  “others” suggests 
that non-sailor participation was significant enough to warrant 
its inclusion in a description of  the unrest. Distinguishing itself  
from analogous contemporary maritime protests, the Knowles 
Riot seemed to contain far more of  these “other” participants 
among the mob’s ranks.
 In a more abstract sense, another key facet of  the 
Knowles Riot involved the role and nature of  elite support for 
the protests. In some ways, the role of  social and political elites is 
related to trends in other episodes of  resistance to impressment. 
For example, the opinions of  Boston’s elite were not monolithic. 
According to Thomas Hutchinson, “a number of  gentlemen” 
contacted Governor Shirley and assured him that “they would 
stand by him” against the protesters.105 Although this group did 
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not constitute enough men for Shirley to put down the riot, or 
even enough for him to remain in the city, it shows that some 
members of  the upper classes opposed the rioters. Similarly, 
Shirley himself  noted that some “Officers and Gentlemen” con-
tinued to share in a sense of  “Duty and Attachment to the King’s 
Government.”106 Evidently, he knew that he retained the support 
of  some wealthy Bostonians. These gentlemen who supported 
Shirley were likely concerned about economic consequences, 
such as the potential property damage caused by the unrest. As 
in other riots, the protesters were not completely supported by 
all members of  the upper classes. 
 Still, the arguments made by the mercantile elite in de-
fense of  the rioters echoed the economic arguments of  elites in 
other ports. Boston’s merchants, as in seaports across the British 
Empire, viewed impressment as a depredation on shipping that 
left vessels without essential manpower. Such losses manifested 
themselves in various ways. In one case, as Josiah Gains men-
tioned in his deposition, a ship was left adrift in Boston Har-
bor without its crew after being accosted by a press gang from 
Knowles’s squadron. The abandoned ship then encountered 
“an Exceeding hard Gale of  Wind” that “drove her Ashoar,” 
causing “great damage” to the ship and her cargo.107 The con-
cern about impressment’s immediate negative consequences on 
property was a primary motivator of  the merchant elite’s op-
position. Those who stood to lose monetarily often made ap-
peals on behalf  of  their property. John Cathcart, master of  a 
ship in Boston Harbor, wrote directly to Governor Shirley in 
the hopes of  obtaining some sort of  “account of  the measures 
for the relief  of  his distressed ship,” trying to receive redress for 
the havoc wreaked by impressment.108 In the long-term, Bos-
ton’s merchants feared even more extreme damages. As a let-
ter published in the Independent Advertiser noted, the entire town 
would eventually suffer from “the great Injury…to the Planta-
tions by being drained of  their people,” indicating the severity 
of  the manpower shortage caused by the frequent impressment 
Penn History Review     119 
Commerce and Conflict
of  working-age men.109 These economic concerns explain the 
rationale behind the mercantile elite’s support for the rioters.
 The most prominent display of  the sentiments of  
Boston’s economic elite towards the rioters and the mercantile 
support for the mob’s protests is found in the work of  William 
Douglass. Douglass was a distinguished physician with varied 
interests, including law, medicine, botany, and astronomy, but 
his vehement opposition to impressment was published in his 
Summary, Historical and Political, of  the First Planting, Progressive 
Improvements, and Present State of  the British Settlements in North-
America.110 Shortly after the Knowles Riot, sections of  Doug-
lass’s work were published serially in Boston’s newspapers. He 
used the typical mercantile arguments to respond to Knowles’s 
actions. Douglass’s criticism of  Knowles’s conduct and character 
was so severe that, as mentioned above, Knowles initiated the 
libel suit of  Knowles v. Douglass.111 Douglass personally critiqued 
Knowles in his rebuke, but he primarily attacked impressment’s 
harmful economic effects. Brunsman suggests that the critique 
was based on disdain for the rioting caused by impressment but, 
in reality, the argument was largely economic.112 Douglass noted 
that impressment “hinders” both the “trade and navigation” 
of  the places from which sailors are taken.113 In this analysis, 
opposition to impressment derives from a practical economic 
claim. Elsewhere, Douglass explained the longstanding “Dis-
pute between the Admiralty and the Trade” as a rift between 
the interests of  the merchants and their protectors.114 While the 
Royal Navy grumbled that merchants lured sailors into deser-
tion, merchants complained about the hardships imposed by 
impressment.115 Douglass ultimately supported the merchants, 
arguing that impressment was directly linked to the “distressing 
of  trade” in Boston.116 Through his work on the development of  
the British colonies in North America, William Douglass offered 
the typical mercantile elite argument against impressment by 
placing the town’s economic interest against the military’s need 
for manpower.
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 In tandem with the anti-impressment economic response 
of  Boston’s mercantile elite, the Knowles Riot also uniquely fos-
tered an intellectual elite opposition. Unlike in other impressment 
riots, the Knowles Riot provoked the emergence of  a coherent 
ideological argument among intellectuals against impressment 
predicated on the sailors’ liberties and natural rights. The foun-
dations of  these ideological arguments were not entirely novel. 
As Rodger writes, plans for compulsory service in the military 
were often “rejected as incompatible with English liberties.”117 
Similarly, Massachusetts’s House of  Representatives had already 
written as early as 1720 that impressment was a violation of  the 
“common Liberty of  the Subject.”118 It was only a small, logical 
step to extend this opposition to schemes that took sailors off  
the waterfront and merchant ships and forced them to serve in 
the Royal Navy. The specific innovation in Boston in 1747 was 
the rapid and widespread application of  these ideas as a reac-
tion to a specific instance of  impressment. A letter published on 
December 28 justified the rioting by saying that, though people 
must submit to political authorities that “govern…for the good 
of  the Society,” they also have an obligation to “oppose them, if  
they design their Ruin or Destruction.”119 In the same letter, the 
author made a claim to the “Liberties of  Englishmen” that would 
be echoed several decades later in the American Revolution.120 
By staking this claim to liberties, the author took a frequent argu-
ment of  English mobs and tied it to American colonial unrest. A 
later anonymous pamphlet, entitled Plain Truth, also supported a 
“glorious” defense of  “our…most precious Liberty and Property,” 
comparing the situation to the Glorious Revolution.121 By adapt-
ing preexisting notions of  liberty and natural rights to the con-
text of  Boston’s unrest, these writers tried to justify the mob’s 
actions.
 A final iteration of  this ideological argument in contem-
porary newspapers can be found in the Independent Advertiser, 
which was founded by Samuel Adams in the aftermath of  the 
Knowles Riot. In its inaugural issue on January 4, 1748, the paper 
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established a purpose of  “defend[ing] the Rights and Liberties 
of  Mankind…to improve the Trade, the Manufactures, and Hus-
bandry of  the Country.”122 In so doing, the newspaper implicitly 
joined the traditional economic arguments against impressment, 
embodied as issues of  trade, manufactures, and husbandry, with 
the language of  rights and liberties. In pursuing this mission, the 
Independent Advertiser continued to advocate the mob’s right to 
protest. Later on, the paper published a letter that defended the 
mob for exercising “the natural right which every man has…to 
repel those Mischiefs [of  the press gangs]” by participating in the 
tumult.123 It argued that, in the absence of  a “sufficient Remedy,” 
the rioters “have a natural Right to defend themselves,” as in 
the case of  Knowles’s actions.124 The same letter began with an 
appropriate quote from Cicero’s Pro Milone, the speech given in 
defense of  Titus Annius Milo in 52 BCE. The section quoted, 
in translation, dictates that people should be allowed to “repel 
all violence…from their persons, from their liberties, and from 
their lives,” in which case, “you cannot decide this action to have 
been wrong.”125 This author deliberately drew upon the storied 
history of  the Roman Republic to justify the mob’s actions. In 
the unique context of  Boston’s Knowles Riot, these ideologi-
cal arguments applied the preexisting language of  the rights and 
liberties of  sailors in order to justify the mob’s actions.
 This argument in favor of  the liberties and rights of  the 
sailors found a surprisingly sympathetic response from Massa-
chusetts Bay’s political bodies. On two occasions, these institu-
tions acknowledged the rights-based grievances of  the victims 
of  Knowles’s press. Following the riot, as discussed above, mem-
bers of  the Town Meeting tried to shift the blame for the unrest 
towards marginalized members of  the society, such as slaves and 
foreign sailors. They published their proceedings in the hopes 
of  appealing to Governor Shirley. By and large, these proceed-
ings served this purpose. However, they also noted that their 
response was decided “notwithstanding…that the Rights and 
Privileges of  the Town had been invaded by the unwarrantable 
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Impress that had been made of  several of  their Inhabitants,” 
thereby adopting the language of  the mob’s intellectual support-
ers.126 Though this acknowledgment did not lend direct support 
to the rioters in the aftermath of  the tumult, it demonstrates 
the argument’s influence. Similarly, the House of  Representatives 
partially recognized that the government had violated individuals’ 
rights. On November 19, the House resolved that it would exert 
itself  in “all Ways and Means Possible, in redressing such griev-
ances as his Majesty’s subjects are and have been under,” thereby 
acknowledging the legitimacy of  the citizenry’s complaints.127 In 
these instances, the government seems to have partially accepted 
the claim that impressment impinged on Bostonians’ liberties.
 Much like with the economic arguments, the rights-based 
intellectual arguments are best embodied by the work of  a young 
Boston lawyer, in this case, Samuel Adams. Before becoming a 
leading figure of  Boston’s mob and founding groups such as 
the Loyal Nine and the Sons of  Liberty, Adams was a twenty-
five-year-old lawyer who had just completed a dissertation on 
natural rights at Harvard in the years leading up to the Knowles 
Riot.128 In 1748, Adams started a newspaper called the Independent 
Advertiser. As briefly mentioned, the paper argued against im-
pressment by defending the rights and liberties of  the sailors and 
citizens of  Boston. In a separate pamphlet, Adams articulated 
the language and philosophy that animated his opposition. Un-
der the pseudonym of  Amicus Patriae, “A Friend of  Our Coun-
try,” Adams raged against the press gang’s conduct as an “Insult 
upon our Liberties.”129 Specifically, though he acknowledged that 
the “impressing of  Seamen…has been long in Practice,” he re-
jected the notion that it had the “Force of  Law.”130 Adams also 
synthesized some of  the more conventional arguments against 
impressment with his novel approach. He incorporated many 
of  the concerns of  the merchant elite, decrying the damaging 
effects on trade and commerce. He also adopted many of  the 
mob’s complaints, citing the impact of  taking men from “their 
Families and Friends.”131 As a consequence of  including these 
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types of  arguments, his own natural rights-based critique of  
impressment is extended as a rather subtle addition to his argu-
ment. Nonetheless, Adams distinguished his own strain of  op-
positional critique by adopting the language of  natural rights and 
characterizing Knowles’s actions as a “lawless Attack upon our 
Liberty.”132 In this understanding, though he condemned some 
of  the rioting, the mob could be justified as a body acting in 
defense of  its natural rights. Adams’s argument, typical of  works 
that emphasized rights and liberties, represents the core of  an 
While publishing the Independent Advertiser and writing under the pseudonym 
Amicus Patriae, Samuel Adams (1722–1803) articulated a natural rights-based 
opposition to impressment in the aftermath of  the Knowles Riot.
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emergent intellectual criticism of  impressment offered by non-
merchant Bostonians.
 Interestingly, these two elite perspectives, though united 
in their conclusions, often disagreed, with some of  these con-
flicts spilling onto the pages of  Boston’s newspapers. Though 
these emergent schools of  thought may have agreed in principle 
in their opposition to impressment, their motives varied. On 
December 21, 1747, William Douglass published an excerpt of  
his work in the Boston Evening Post. In it, he wrote that “the least 
Appearance of  a Mob (so called from Mobile Vulgus) ought to be 
suppressed, even where their Intention in any particular Affair is 
of  itself  very good; because they become Nurseries for danger-
ous Tumults.”133 In short, his statement epitomized a merchant’s 
general sentiments towards the rioters. Though the mob was 
agitating for the end of  impressment, which benefited the mer-
chants, it is not surprising that these wealthy businessmen were 
uncomfortable with civil disturbances perpetrated by the lower 
orders. In response, an argument published in the Independent 
Advertiser on February 8, 1748, roundly condemned Douglass. 
There, the author began by noting that Douglass had “justly 
observed in another place the great Injury which must accrue 
to the Plantations by being drained of  their people,” thereby 
following in Adams’s example by acknowledging the mercantile 
opposition to impressment.134 However, he went on to denounce 
Douglass’s characterization of  the mob and his call for greater 
punishment of  rioters, arguing that this “Suggestion” would be 
“so unnecessary, so cruel and unjust” that it would become a 
“Scandal upon the Character of  the Country.”135 Clearly, those 
with economic objections and those with philosophical qualms 
had similar goals, but the two groups diverged on their opinions 
of  the rioting itself.
 While this conflict poses an interesting topic for further 
study, its importance for this analysis is to demonstrate that even 
those in Boston’s higher society who detested impressment did 
not necessarily agree about the implications of  their opposition. 
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As in impressment riots elsewhere, the arguments made by mer-
chants mainly supported the status quo by defending their eco-
nomic interests while condemning the social unrest caused by the 
protesters. However, the application of  rights-based ideological 
arguments by intellectuals in opposition to a specific episode of  
impressment represented a unique feature of  Boston’s Knowles 
Riot. In fact, this conflict heightens the distinction between the 
two competing elite arguments against impressment. By means 
of  this separation, the novelty of  Adams’s philosophical argu-
ment becomes an even more apparent departure from prior 
perspectives. Though the arguments employed by these groups 
often overlapped, their fundamental disagreement that has 
been preserved on the pages of  Boston’s newspapers exposed 
the clash between the traditional mercantile arguments and the 
emergent rights-based philosophical response of  Bostonians 
such as Samuel Adams.
 Broadly speaking, several continuities demonstrate how 
the Knowles Riot was influenced by prior unrest. The grievances 
expressed by the mob were focused largely on the human impact 
of  being pressed into service, and the mercantile elite support 
of  their opposition, on the basis of  its effects on business, find 
clear parallels across riots in British ports such as Liverpool and 
Bristol. The Boston mob, however, must be distinguished for the 
widespread severity and broad implications of  the Knowles Riot. 
This understanding should not minimize the support received 
by sailors in other port cities. Rather, it emphasizes the mass 
participation achieved in Boston that was made possible by the 
linkages between Bostonian life and the maritime professions. 
Though these linkages were not necessarily weaker in other mar-
itime communities, these connections were apparently leveraged 
to garner broader support for sailors’ protests in Boston. Oth-
erwise, it would have been impossible for the Knowles Riot to 
escalate into a protest of  “several thousand people,” as Thomas 
Hutchinson wrote, or, at the very least, the Boston militia might 
have mustered under Governor Shirley’s orders.136 Similarly, the 
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emergent intellectual opinion in response to the press in 1747 
presents a unique approach towards opposition. As noted before, 
the association between natural rights and impressment was not 
entirely novel. Through the writings of  Adams and others, how-
ever, this language was operationalized in defense of  a specific 
riot, providing intellectual ammunition to oppose impressment 
in practical terms. These writings complicate traditional assump-
tions about pre-Revolutionary mob actions in the American 
colonies. In particular, it challenges Bernard Bailyn’s claim that 
riots in the American colonies before 1765 were “ideologically 
inert.”137 While the Knowles Riot certainly borrowed from other 
impressment riots, it also presented a unique case of  widespread 
communal upheaval tied to a philosophical claim of  natural 
rights and liberties.
 The Knowles Riot was neither the first nor the last im-
pressment riot in the British Empire. There is immense value 
in acknowledging and understanding the Knowles Riot in this 
context. The sailors and their fellow Bostonians who engaged 
in this form of  mass protest would have been aware of  prior 
unrest in the city, such as the Wager Incident of  1745, in which 
two merchant sailors were murdered by press gangs.138 Similarly, 
this instance of  crowd action would inform and influence devel-
opments across the Atlantic. For example, when whalers in Liv-
erpool in 1759 took hostages from a press gang, they drew on a 
vernacular of  opposition that was utilized in the Knowles Riot.139 
At the same time, comparison with the transatlantic history of  
impressment riots shows that the Knowles Riot was, in many 
ways, unique. To some degree, historians such as Russell Bourne 
are correct in analyzing the riot in the context of  Boston’s com-
munal history.140 The communal participation in Boston’s riot 
paints a portrait of  a deeply interconnected community with its 
nexus at the waterfront. A deeper understanding of  the actions 
of  sailors and the interconnection of  ideas across the Atlantic 
maritime environment reveals how the Knowles Riot was woven 
into a web of  broader opposition to impressment in the British 
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Empire. Though it is tempting to understand the Knowles Riot 
as the opening salvo in a barrage of  Bostonian unrest that was 
followed by episodes of  resistance in Boston Common and 
Boston Harbor, it is better understood as a startling broadside 
in a conflict that stretched across the North American colonies, 
the Caribbean, and the British Isles throughout the eighteenth 
century.
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